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South Carolina has not as yet clearly outlined the legal
basis for that distinction, but Smith v. Culbertson, (1855),
9 Rich. 106, 43 S. C. L., would not admit an affidavit of a
juror as to a quotient verdict, and State v. Parris, (1931),
163 S. C. 295, 161 S. E. 496, at page 299, also would not
countenance admission of unsworn statements of jurors, as
said therein at page 299:
The statements of the jurors, filed in the lower Court,
have been submitted in the record to this Court. As to
these statements, we desire to say that they should not
have been presented to, or received by, the Court. Even
if they had been sworn to, it was improper for them
to have been presented or received. In fact, the jurors
should not have signed these statements, which, perhaps they did without understanding that their action
was improper. The zealous young counsel, who has, with
much ability, presented his client's cause in this Court
in his effort to secure, what he conceived to be, justice
in that client's behalf, committed an error, which we
know was absolutely unintentional on his part when he
secured and offered the jurors' statements to the Court.

Without reflecting, or with the slightest intention to
reflect, upon the counsel or any of the jurors, we must
nevertheless express our disapproval of what was done
in this regard. We invite attention to the language of
the distinguished jurist, David L. Wardlaw, in Smith
v. Culbertson, 9 Rich. (43 S. C. L.), 106, where he said:
"The mischiefs, the delays, the arts, the scandal likely
to ensue, come naturally to our thoughts, when we
imagine encouragement given to the pursuit of jurors
by disappointed suitors, for the purpose of obtaining
affidavits to invalidate verdicts regularly rendered."
See, also, State v. Long, 93 S. C., 502, 77 S. E., 61.
NEW TRIALS
Sections 10-1215, 10-1461 to 1463 and Circuit Court Rule
72 should be carefully read with their annotations. A new
trial in South Carolina means trying the case de novo, e.i.
re-trying it in its factual entirety, or from scratch. See
Durst et al. v. So. Ry. et al. (1931), 161 S. C. 498, 159 S. E.
844, Mishoe v. A. C. L. R. R. (1938), 186 S. C. 402, 197 S. E.
97.
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In Elliott v. Black River Elec. Cooperative (1958), S. C. -- , 104 S. E. 2d 357, at page 372, the court differentiates new trial nisi and new trial absolute, and when each is
grantable, as follows:
...An order for a new trial nisi is one whereby a
new trial is granted unless the party opposing it shall
comply with a condition prescribed by it. A motion
for a new trial nisi because of excessiveness of the
verdict contemplates not the striking down of the verdict in toto, but remission of part of it and the granting
of a new trial in default thereof. Such a motion is
founded on the contention that the verdict was not inherently unlawful, but was, under the facts of the case,
unduly liberal; it is addressed to the discretion of the
trial judge, who alone has power to reduce a verdict in
this manner; and his refusal to grant it will not be
reviewed here. Brown v. Hill, 228 S. C. 34, 88 S. E. 2d
838. When it is desired to attack a verdict upon the
ground that it is so shockingly excessive as to warrant
the conclusion that the jury was moved by passion,
prejudice or other improper considerations, the appropriate motion is for a new trial absolute; because such
a verdict, being inherently vicious, is wholly unlawful,
and no part of it may be permitted to stand.
If a verdict is excessive, the trial judge has discretionary
power to grant a new trial nisi, i. e., unless the party recovering money remits a part of the verdict. This is done
by the attorney for that party endorsing on the record in
the clerk's office, over his signature, a remission of the
amount ordered. If that is done, then there is no new trial.
Also, it is only when the trial record shows that there was
caprice or prejudice on the part of the trial judge that the
appellate court will disturb his order. Morrel v. S. C. Power
Co. (1938), 186 S. C. 308, 195 S. E. 638, Brown v. Hill,
(1955), 228 S. C. 34, 88 S. E. 2d 838. As declared by the
Court at page 44 in the latter case:
Exception No. 6 charges error in refusal of appellant's
motion for new trial nisi upon the ground that "there
was not sufficient or substantial evidence to support
the amount of the jury's verdict, said verdict being the
result of passion and prejudice and based upon improper
and speculative evidence". So far as it was based upon
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the charge that the verdict was the result of passion and
prejudice, the motion for new trial nisi was inappropriate. If a verdict is so grossly excessive as to indicate that the jury was moved by passion or prejudice,
it is the duty of the trial court to set it aside, not reduce
it. If its amount is such as to indicate merely undue
liberality on the part of the jury, the power to reduce
it rests with the trial judge alone, and his refusal to
do so will not be reviewed here. Nelson v. Charleston
& W. C. Ry. Co., S. C., 86 S. E. (2d) 56. Considering
the motion in the instant case as one for a new trial
absolute, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial
judge in his denial of it. At the time of her injury respondent was twenty-six years of age and in good health.
She had been employed in the same textile factory for
about eight years, and at the time of the accident her
rate of pay was $1.00 per hour. From the testimony
of the surgeon who performed the operation on her leg
immediately after the accident, and under whose care
she still remained up to the time of the triWl more than
a year later, it appeared that she had undergone six
operations, had been hospitalized for some fifteen weeks,

was still totally disabled, would require surgical attention for nine months or a year longer, and would have
some permanent disability because of shortening of the
injured leg and limitation of motion in the knee and
hip. In view of this testimony, we cannot say that the
verdict, for $10,000.00 actual damages, was so shockingly excessive as to require the conclusion that it was
the result of passion or prejudice.
Writ of Attaint: Fortunately, our social and legal development is such that the writ of attaint, with its almost unbelievable injustice, is now entirely out of the picture. It
is now solely a discretionary power of the trial judge, who
in South Carolina steps in as the 7th or 13th juror. Fallon
v. Rucks (1950), 217 S. C. 180, 60 S. E. (2d) 88. As said beginning at page 188:
The problem presented by the original failure of the
jury to distinguish the nature of the damages included
in the verdict was close to that recently considered by
this court in Limehouse v. Southern Ry. Co., S. C., 58
S. E. (2d) 685, and our earlier relevant cases were
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there cited and discussed, with [which (sic)] renders
unnecessary present review of them. The rule deducible
from these authorities is that upon rendition of a verdict which is improper in form, objection must ordinarily be immediately made in order to save the point
of either litigant thereabout. Here the court raised
objection before publication of the verdict and the
record is clear that counsel consented, impliedly if not
expressly, that the case be resubmitted to the jury after
further instruction. That course was followed and the
jury reformed the verdict, thereby removing the objection. It was said in the Limehouse opinion, page 689
of the S. E. report, that it was unnecessary to determine
in that case whether upon publication of the verdict, the
court was empowered to require the jury to reconsider
the case so as to bring in a proper verdict. Here, incidentally, the objectionable verdict was not published,
but was inspected and discussed by the court and counsel, at the invitation of the judge, without the hearing
of the jury. More important, and conclusive, is that
there was reconsideration and amendment of the verdict by the jury by consent of all. We cannot avoid the
conclusion that whatever error in the verdict there may
have been was effectively cured and no ground remained
for complaint by respondents. They should not have
been heard to complain of contended error which had
already been corrected with their consent. The court
erred in granting new trial upon the alleged error in
the form of the original verdict, and that is all that is
embodied in the appeal. "A jury's verdict should be
upheld when it is possible to do so and carry into effect
what was clearly the jury's intention." Joiner v. BeVier,
155 S. C. 340, 152 S. E. 652, 656.
The decisions cited by respondents have been carefully considered. [Cases Cited]
The cases typify the power of a trial judge to grant
a new trial absolute or nisi in a law case upon his disapproval of the verdict on factual grounds. The power
has often been said to be inherent and it is expressly
authorized by the terms of secs. 34 and 605 of the Code.
It is an essential discretion of a trial court which this
court does not possess under the present constitution.
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See the decisions in the footnotes to the cited Code sections.
But the discretion is founded upon the facts, the evidence, the witnesses, the trial circumstances, the verdict
and the judge's view of them, hence his sometime designation as the thirteenth juror. No such element is
present in the case at bar. Proper grounds were laid
in respondents' motion for new trial to call into play
discretionary power to grant it, but the judge overruled
them; and he granted it only upon the wholly untenable
ground of objection to the verdict's form before it was
amended by the jury upon resubmission by consent.
Judicial discretion was not involved. Its purported exercise was error.
The writ of attaint, unbelievable as it may seem, is set
forth in 3 Bl. Comm. at page 404 as follows:
Under a writ of attaint the inquiry was made by a
jury, double the number of those who rendered the
alleged false verdict, and if they found the verdict a
false one, the judgment of the common law was, that

the jurors should become infamous; should forfeit
their goods and the profits of their lands; should themselves be imprisoned, and their wives and children
thrown out of doors; should have their houses razed,
their trees extirpated, and their meadows plowed; and
that the plaintiff should be restored to all that he lost
by reason of the unjust verdict.
Why Grounds Should be Used and Not Exceptions: It
should be noted that both sections 10-1461 and 10-1462 use
the word "exceptions" in connection with a motion for a
new trial. It rarely, if ever, functions in that connection.
The word "grounds" has taken its place in practice, thereby
avoiding confusion with the necessary use of "exceptions"
in appeal procedure. Section 7-406, Supreme Rule 4, Sections 1 & 6.
In this State can a judge of his own motion grant a new
trial? There is no South Carolina case in point but he should
be able to do so, if the analagous case of McCall v. Cohen
(1881), 16 S. C. 445, holding he could grant of his own mo,tion a nonsuit is kept in mind, though he must be very careful in taking such a step.
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South Carolina follows the majority rule that, though on
a reasonable inference the judge must let the case go to the
jury, still, as the 7th or 13th juror, if the verdict is against
the preponderance of the evidence or is manifestly unjust,
he can set it aside but only by granting a new trial before
another jury, See Fallon v. Rucks, ante.
In other words, even if there is a "mountain" of evidence
in favor of one party and only a "molehill" in favor of the
other, the "molehill", if a scintilla or reasonable inference,
carries it to the jury, but if a verdict is based on that and
not on the "mountain" the judge, if his conscience is shocked,
has the power to grant a new trial, and the Supreme Court
can't interfere unless he has abused his discretion or been
capricious. Mishoe v. A. C. L. Ry. Co. (1938), 186 S. C. 402,
197 S.E. 97, states on page 424:
Concerning the suggestion that the return of a verdict for $40,000.00, in the absence of specific instructions
as to the several elements of damage which might be
considered by them, and the lack of direct testimony as
to the earning capacity of deceased, warrants this Court
in concluding that the jury gave no serious or judicial

consideration to the primary issues of (1) negligence,
(2) proximate cause, (3) contributory negligence, and
(4) contributory gross negligence, suffice it so say that
we know of no decision of the Court of last resort of any
jurisdiction, nor has any been called to our attention,
which has gone so far as to declare that a grossly excessive verdict indicates that the jury returning the
same did not give such consideration to those fundamental issues. And, in the very nature of the secrecy
imposed upon a jury's deliberations, it is impossible for
a Court, confined by salutary, constitutional limitations
to the correction of errors of law only, so to adjudicate.
For aught that appears to the contrary, the jury in the
instant cause may have given most careful and deliberate
consideration to the primary issues of negligence, proximate cause, contributory negligence, and contributory
gross negligence before deciding such issues adversely
to appellants, and yet made a mistake, if one were made,
in estimating the damages. Certainly, there is no suggestion of any basis in the record for an adjudication
here that the amount awarded as damages discloses "as
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a matter of law," or "as a fact susceptible of no other
reasonable inference," that the jury did not give proper
consideration to the underlying issue of liability.
Nor can we say, although conceding that the verdict
was a large one, that the sum awarded is so excessive
as to force the conclusion (1) that it was the result of
caprice, passion, prejudice, sympathy, or other considerations not founded in the evidence and (2) that the
trial Judge's refusal to grant a new trial absolute,
though exercising his authority to reduce the verdict,
constituted a manifest abuse of the discretionary power
exclusively vested in him; nor that any "such error appears as to warrant our imputing to Judge and jury
a connivance in escaping the limits of the law." [Cases

cited]
Again at page 426 it is declared:
An appellate Court, confined to the correction of errors of law only, cannot conclude, from a verdict that
is excessive as to amount, that the jury gave no serious
or judicial consideration to the primary issue of liability
- without invading the constitutional province of the
triers of the facts; the most that can be said of an excessive verdict is that the jury erred in fixing the
amount, either through passion, prejudice, caprice, sympathy, or some other consideration not founded in the
evidence, and, for that reason, the aggrieved party did
not receive that consideration to which every litigant
is entitled; and (9) under the statute, the evidence, the
charge of the trial Judge, and the former decisions of
this Court, the verdict, concededly a substantial one, is
not so large as to warrant the holding here that "the
facts are susceptible of no other reasonable inference
than that the verdict was so excessive as to indicate
that it was the result of prejudice, caprice, or passion,
or other consideration not founded on the evidence, and
that the Circuit Judge's refusal to grant a new trial
(absolute) amounted to manifest abuse of the discretionary power in such matters, exclusively vested in him
by law."

A motion for a new trial in South Carolina must be made
prior to the adjournment for the term. It may be argued
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later, regardless of the old Molair case, annotated under See.
10-1466, but only if certain conditions are met. The attorney
making the motion should see to it that the judge marks the
motion "heard" and puts his signature or at least his initials
beneath same on the calendar, and that opposing counsel is
duly notified or consents. If not, the right of hearing the
motion can be lost. Altman v. Efird Bros. Co. (1936), 180
S. C.205, 185 S. E. 543, lays down the rule at p. 211:
"Has a trial judge the power and right, after the adjournment of the court sine die, to pass an order which

reverses or modifies the order made in term time?
"It is such a well-settled principle of law in this state
that, when a trial judge adjourns his court sine die, he
loses jurisdiction of a case finally determined during
that term, except under special circumstances, as where
either by consent or acquiescence of counsel for both
sides, or postponing determination of motions duly
entered during the sitting of the court, or in some cases
where supplemental orders germane to and carrying out
the order duly made, and not inconsistent therewith,
may be passed, that any extended discussion thereof is
deemed unnecessary."
In the case now before the Court appellant's attorney,
in the absence of respondent's attorney, notified the
Court that he would make a motion for a new trial;
thereupon, his Honor "noted" the motion, but did not
mark it "heard". Thereafter, when the term of the
Court had adjourned sine die, the trial Judge notified
the attorney for appellant that he would hear the motion on a certain day. On the morning of that day, appellant's counsel notified respondent's counsel that the
motion would then be heard. Respondent's counsel appeared and stated to the Court that this was the first
time that he had heard that a motion for a new trial
had been made, that he was taken by surprise and asked
for time, which was given him.
The Court had adjourned sine die before respondent's
counsel was even aware that a motion for a new trial had
been "noted"; there was no agreement of counsel about
it, the motion was not marked "heard." The fact that
respondent's counsel was called on and did resist the

motion, after the Court had adjourned sine die, could
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not confer in the trial Judg6 jurisdiction to hear the
motion. ...
Circuit Court Rule 47 is seldom, if ever, used now. It
seems to be like Rule 48. See annotation under latter Rule,
which says it seems this rule is no longer in force. One
wonders why either rule should still be in the Code.
When Should a Judge Send Jury Out? At this point, though
the matter doesn't strictly pertain to new trials, attention
should be called to the recent case of State v. Chasteen
(1955), 228 S. C. 88, 88 S. E. 2d 880, which treats of a rather
legal as well as practical dilemma in dealing with the voluntariness of a confession (the same would apply to a dying
declaration). Should the judge in first passing on the factual
issue of voluntariness send the jury out? If he does, the
identical testimony should be again brought out before the
jury, and yet a witness may answer differently, or his demeanor and conduct on the stand may be entirely different.
This would mean that, besides the waste of time, the jury
would not be trying the exact issue that the judge did.
On the other hand, if the jury is not sent out and the
judge finds the confession inadmissible, the jury would have
heard evidence which, though they be charged not to consider
it, will function at least in their sub-consciousness. The
South Carolina court calls attention to the rule in other
jurisdictions that the jury should be absent but doesn't

finally decide the point, however, it suggests on page 98
that "That the better practice is for the trial Judge to conduct the preliminary inquiry and determine the admissibility
of the confession in the absence of the jury."
A New Trial on After Discovered Evidence: There is no
definite time limit in this State for making a new trial motion on the above ground. State v. Williams (1917), 108 S. C.
295, 93 S. E. 1006, declares at page 298:
But in the Courts of law of the United States, a party
may, under certain circumstances, become entitled to a
new trial on account of newly discovered testimony; the
ground being that the facts upon which he now relies
are external to those which transpired at the trial. Can
this appellant be cut off, then, from the opportunity
of availing himself of this testimony because, at the
time of his conviction, he moved for a new trial on the
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then existing facts, and, failing in that, sentence had
been pronounced against him? If this be so, the right
of a new trial on the ground of after-discovered testimony is a delusion and a snare. It is a promise to the
ear, but broken to the hope. If this be so, the only possible case in which such testimony could be made available would be where the party had waived his motion
at the trial.
The right to a new trial on newly-discovered testimony, when sufficient, is as fully settled and guaranteed
by the law as any other, and this right cannot be lost
because a new trial had once been refused upon facts
wholly different from and not involving this newly discovered testimony.
Even after judgment has been affirmed on appeal,
it is within the discretionary power of the Circuit Court
to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. State v. Lee, 80 S. C. 367, 61 S. E. 657.
The statute empowering the Circuit Judges to grant
new trials on after-discovered evidence does not limit
the time within which the motion must be made. Sams
v. Hoover, 33 S. C. 401, 12 S. E. 8. Nor is there any
prescribed time within which the Circuit Court shall
exercise its inherent right to grant new trials in such
cases. If a party is entitled to a new trial, and is serving the sentence imposed upon him, there is even a
stronger reason for hearing his motion than if he had
not entered upon the service of his sentence, as his
rights are thereby more directly affected.
State v. Strickland (1942), 201 S. C. 170, 22 S. E. 2d 417,
apparently leaves no doubt that due diligence must be used
and that a failure to make the motion more than nine
months after a trial resulting in a conviction is lack of such
diligence and warrants a denial of such motion. However,
it should be remembered that due diligence, like a reasonable
time depends after all upon the circumstances of the particular case. In this connection Supreme Court Rule 24 should
be carefully considered.
Even the Supreme Court on its own motion can raise the
point. Smith vs. Quattlebaum (1953), 223 S. C. 384, 390,
76 S. E. 2d 154. If that is so, then even more than nine
months can elapse.
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The conditions for granting such a motion in South Carolina are the usual ones:
1. Evidence must be discovered after former trial.
2. Could not have been discovered by due diligence for
use in former trial.
3. Must be material.
4. Must appear that the evidence will probably, not
merely possibly, change the result.
5. That it is not merely impeaching.
6. That it is not merely cumulative.
See Johnston v. Belk-McKnight Co., Inc. (1938), 188 S. C.
149, at page 153, 198 S. E. 395. That case at pages 157 and
158 also tackles the difficult problem as to what is cumulative
and what is impeaching evidence. One finds the following:
Is it merely cumulative, or impeaching?
In the case of McCabe v. Sloan, supra, this Court on
the consideration of the question 'What constitutes
cumulative evidence?", adopted the following statement
from 20 R. C. L., 297, Sec. 79.
"What Constitutes Cumulative Evidence. - Cumulative evidence has been tersely defined as additional evi-

dence of the same kind to the same point. It is apparent
that there is a wide difference in meaning between the
terms 'of the same kind' and 'to the same point', as
used in the various definitions. Newly discovered evidence, to be cumulative, must not only tend to prove
facts which were in evidence at the trial, but must be
the same kind of evidence as that produced at the trial
to prove those facts. If it is of a different kind, though
upon the same issue, or of the same kind on a different
issue, it is not cumulative. Nor is evidence cumulative
in the legal sense which, while tending to establish the
same general result, does it by proof of a new and distinct fact. To render evidence subject to the objection
that it is cumulative, in the legal sense, it must be
cumulative, not with respect to the main issue between
the parties, but on some collateral or subordinate fact
bearing on that issue. * * * Newly discovered evidence
raising a new ground of claim or defense is, of course,
not cumulative, nor is evidence explaining an apparent
conflict in or contradicting, evidence offered at the trial.
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Newly discovered evidence of admissions has been held
not to be cumulative to evidence of facts and circumstances."
From Section 72 of the same authority this is taken:
"As a general rule a new trial will not be granted
on account of the discovery of facts and circumstances
merely cumulative in their character. The reason of the
rule is that public policy, looking to the finality of trials,
requires that the parties be held to diligence in preparing
their cases for trial, and it is not, strictly speaking, an
independent rule, but a mere corollary of the requirement that the newly discovered evidence must be such
as to render a different result probable on a retrial of
the case. The rule must, however, be taken in its proper
sense, and is not to be understood as precluding a new
trial in every case, where the new testimony relates to a
point contested on the former trial; for if it were so a
new trial could seldom, if ever, be granted in any case."
The Court adheres to the announcement there made.
Is the newly discovered evidence "impeaching"? This
term appears in connection with Subsection 5, which
prescribes that the newly discovered evidence "must not
be cumulative or impeaching."
We do not understand that the words "cumulative"
and "impeaching" mean the same thing. Cumulative
evidence, as we have seen, supplements that which has
already been testified. Impeaching must mean that
which is outside the evidence already given, and impeaches that evidence; it may be by attacking the
character, the motives, the integrity, or veracity of those
who gave the testimony.
Black's Law Dictionary, Third Ed., page 922, gives this
definition of the word "impeach" :
"In the Law of Evidence - To call in question the
veracity of a witness by means of evidence adduced for
that purpose. The adducing of proof that a witness is
unworthy of belief."
We do not understand that if the new evidence of
independent facts show the inaccuracy of testimony, and
thereby cast reflection upon the witnesses that gave the
testimony, that the newly discovered evidence is ob-
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noxious to the provisions of Subdivision 5 because it
impeaches the witness in the legal meaning of the word
"impeaching."
State v. Pittman (1925), 137 S. C. 75, 134 S. E. 514, seems

to modify the Belk case as to No. 6 saying that cumulative

evidence, if strong, is admissible. It states at page 88:
As to the testimony of Early Harrison, Rufus Plumley,
and H. S. Howard, tending to corroborate Alex Pittman's
plea of alibi, we think the Circuit Judge correctly held
that it was merely cumulative. It is true that newly discovered testimony, which is in a sense cumulative, may
throw such new light on a vital issue and may be of such
compelling force as clearly to require a new trial in the
interest of justice. Such was the character of the afterdiscovered evidence in the cases of State v. Wiley, 106
S. C., 439; 91 S. E., 382, and State v. Casey, 116 S. C.,
281, 108 S. E., 112, cited by appellants. But the testimony here relied on is not, as we apprehend, reasonably
susceptible of that classification or evaluation. ....
However, State v. Strickland, supra, appears to hark back
to the rule as stated in the Belkc case, while State v. Casey
(1921), cited in the Pittman case is distinguished therein
by asserting that if evidence is only incidentally or merely
cumulative but can probably change the result it is admissible.
One has to be thoroughly familiar with these cases to handle
a case properly.
Waiver: In South Carolina the right to a new trial is
waived, if one appeals. Murdock v. Courtnay Mfg. Co.
(1897), 52 S. C. 428, 29 S. E. 856. However, in view of
Supreme Court Rule 24 and the foregoing cases there would
be no such waiver regarding a -likemotion on after-discovered
evidence. See also State v. Hawkins (1922), 121 S. C. 290,
114 S. E. 538, which held that such a motion must be made
before electrocution of a defendant.

Minutes of the Court: This is a phrase of rather indefinite
meaning now. The journal kept by the Clerk of Court comes,
of course, within that phrase, but as to what else, is uncertain. Sec. 15-1762 is never followed now. A judge would be
astounded if a clerk came to read over to him each day the
minutes of that day.
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Improper Separationof Jury: See State v. Loftist (1957),
S. C. _-, 100 S. E. 2d, 671, W~herein a motion for a new
trial, on this ground was made and refused. It was held in
that last paragraph of the decision:
It affirmatively appears, from the record in this case,
that the juror who was separated from the jury under

the circumstances heretofore outlined, was not subjected
to any outside influence by word or act. There is no
showing that any outside influence reached the juror
or the jury. The reverse is true. The motion of the appellant was addressed to the discretion of the presiding
Judge and we see no abuse of discretion in refusing the
motion. There is nothing in the record to show any
injury or prejudice to the appellant.
Form of Motion: A motion for a new trial must have a
specific ground or grounds so that the adversary will have
notice of what he has to meet and the judge of what he has
to decide. South Carolina cases haven't laid down any definite
yardstick as yet, but it is doubtful if just a general ground
such as "for error in the exclusion of evidence" would be
sufficient. On the other hand one would hardly be required
technically to be as specific as an exception would have to be
on appeal under Supreme Court Rule 4, Section 6, which
requires that one state why a ruling was erroneous. State
v. Glenn, (1940), 195 S. C. 410, 11 S. E. 2d 859. However,
to so state a ground for a new trial motion is not only fair
to the adversary and to the Court, but is the safer course.
In view of the above and Circuit Court Rule 47, which,
however, is seldom used in practice, such a motion must be
in writing in this State, or at least dictated to the court
stenographer in open court in the presence of the judge and
opposing attorney and reduced to writing. The last paragraph of Circuit Court Rule 18 furnishes one an analogy.
Can such a motion be heard at chambers? Yes, regardless
of the old cases in 5 and 14 S. C. Reports, wrongly annotated

under Sec. 10-1461. Since those cases, the law was changed
in South Carolina in 1925, which now as a part of Sec. 15-233
gives to the trial judge "all powers" at chambers which he
has in open court except for matters requiring a jury trial.
A note of caution may be suggested here, namely, that there
are quite a few similar errors in the 1952 Code annotations
which an attorney had better watch out for.
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